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There is a burgeoning awareness that polygamy may require legal recog-
nition. The increased liberality of law regarding LGBT families, culmi-
nating last summer in the US Supreme Court’s overturning of state bans 
on same-sex marriage, has prompted scholars, judges, activists, and leg-
islators to ask the question, “if same-sex marriage, why not polygamy?” 
In December 2013, a federal judge struck down the part of Utah’s anti-
polygamy statute that criminalizes cohabitation between a married per-
son and someone other than their spouse. Activists have argued that the 
constitution requires recognition of polygamy or, conversely, that recog-
nition is a mistake that will lead to the further entrenchment of women’s 
subordination (Strassberg 2003). Debates about polygamy usually focus 
on decriminalization and the related question of whether polygamous 
family structures are inherently subordinating women. Recently, how-
ever, a handful of scholars have shifted from arguing about decriminal-
izing to theorizing what full-blown recognition would entail, analogizing 
polygamous relationships to business partnerships or corporations and 
arguing that business law provides a framework for the legal recognition 
of intimate relationships between more than two adults (Davis 2010; 
Drobac and Page 2007; Ertman 2001).1
This essay considers the legal recognition of polygamy from a differ-
ent perspective. Instead of tackling the normative question of whether 
recognition is a desirable goal or what legal form such recognition 
should take, it instead questions whether full recognition is a feasible, 
or even necessary, goal for polygamists and their allies. It argues that 
full recognition of polygamy is more difficult than commonly under-
stood for two reasons: (1) our current family law protects family pri-
vacy to an extent that would be difficult with polygamous relation-
ships, and (2) the current law of marriage involves public benefits 
not infinitely divisible among multiple parties. The essay then argues 
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that, despite these obstacles, we may see legally supported polygamous 
families in the near future, but not through the outright recognition 
of polygamy as a form of marriage. Instead, full recognition may not 
be necessary because elements of polygamous relationships are already 
being recognized through alternative means. Legal mechanisms, such 
as the enforcement of contracts for adult relationships, recognition of 
nonmarital cohabitants, registration schemes such as domestic part-
nership and reciprocal beneficiaries, and recognition of multiparent 
families are already beginning to make the simultaneous recognition 
of multiple relationships possible. Focusing solely on decriminaliza-
tion misses the larger issue: polygamous marriage is an outdated way 
of thinking about adult relationships because marriage itself no longer 
captures the reality of many adult lives. Legal scholars may “misrecog-
nize” the problem of polygamy when they focus on decriminalization 
and full recognition rather than scrutinizing the ways in which polyg-
amy is already partially and unintentionally recognized by law. Rather 
than resisting polygamy as a threat to traditional marriage or embrac-
ing it as a civil rights issue, we instead could use it as an opportunity to 
reevaluate the law of marriage and its relationship to public benefits 
and legal parentage.
Part 1 of the essay begins by observing that, from a legal perspec-
tive, polygamy is a species of marriage. In order to define polygamy and 
understand how it might be recognized, we must first define marriage 
and understand what is at stake in the state’s recognition of personal, 
intimate relationships. Part 2 considers in detail the benefits and obliga-
tions conferred by civil marriage and explores how those benefits and 
obligations might—or might not—apply to polygamous marriages. It 
argues that providing recognition to polygamous marriage would dra-
matically change how state family law works by opening up ongoing 
marriages to state intervention. It then observes that these difficulties 
extend to the public benefits associated with marriage, which would be 
difficult to replicate with multiple spouses. Part 3 shows that despite the 
difficulties with full recognition of polygamy, partial recognition does 
occur, sometimes leading to unintended consequences. Part 4 then 
argues that although the many obstacles to recognition of polygamy 
identified in parts 2 and 3 may prevent full recognition, understand-
ing polygamy as a form of marriage may be a distraction. As marriage 
declines in importance and is no longer the fundamental ordering prin-
ciple of family law, trying to determine whether polygamy “counts” as 
marriage misses the mark. Polygamous families, if they want it, will be 
able to obtain recognition in many ways without being legally married, 
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and these other means may actually be more attractive to them than 
opening up traditional marriage to include multiple spouses.
w h aT  i s  m a r r i ag e ?
In order to consider the project of legally recognizing polygamy, we 
must first articulate the assumptions built into the notion of legal rec-
ognition of an intimate relationship. In the United States, as in most 
Western countries, monogamous marriage has long been the center-
piece of legal recognition of the family. Yet “marriage” is in the eye of 
the beholder and, indeed, can mean many different things depending 
on context. The definition of marriage has also shifted over time, with 
some features becoming increasingly important and some decreasing in 
importance or even falling away altogether.
Sex and Procreation
Traditionally, marriage was the legal status that provided a space for 
state-approved sexual relationships and the procreation of children. 
Fornication and adultery were criminal acts, and nonmarital children 
suffered numerous legal disabilities (Grossman and Friedman 2011). 
This bundling together of marriage, sex, and procreation meant that 
access to marriage was a necessary precondition for state-sanctioned 
sexual and procreative activity. In the famous case of Zablocki v. Redhail, 
where a man challenged a Wisconsin law barring him from marriage 
because he was in arrears on his child support payments for a nonmari-
tal child, the US Supreme Court was explicit about the link between 
marriage, sex, and procreation:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same 
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child 
rearing, and family relationships . . . it would make little sense to recog-
nize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not 
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the founda-
tion of the family in our society . . . if [Redhail’s] right to procreate means 
anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in 
which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.2
In the last fifty years, however, this tight link between marriage, sex, 
and procreation has unraveled. The US Supreme Court has also struck 
down laws discriminating against nonmarital children, bolstered the 
constitutional parentage rights of nonmarital fathers, and overturned 
laws criminalizing nonmarital sex.3 The state’s moral interest in linking 
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these three issues also declined. While in 1986 the court could compare 
homosexual activity to “possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or 
stolen goods,” by 2003 it insisted, in upholding the right of people to 
engage in sodomy, that “our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not 
to mandate our own moral code.”4 These changes in law track changes 
in social behavior. Between 1970 and 2000, the number of cohabiting 
couples rose from 523,000 to 5.5 million (Grossman and Friedman 
2011, 125). Between 1980 and 2011, the percentage of births that were 
nonmarital rose from 18.4 percent to 40.7 percent.5
Although marriage, sex, and procreation have unraveled, they have 
not become completely unbundled. Marriage still provides legal advan-
tages to parents and children. A child born within a marriage, for exam-
ple, is still presumed in many states to be the legal child of its birth 
mother’s spouse, regardless of whether there is actually a genetic rela-
tionship between them (Appleton 2012). Some states still criminalize 
adultery. And many people still consider marriage to be a desirable, if 
not necessary, precondition for childrearing (Cahn and Carbone 2010). 
But “love, marriage, and the baby carriage” no longer always occur in 
that order, or even together at all (McClain 2007).6
Privatized Dependency
Another purpose of marriage has been the privatization of dependency 
(Fineman 2004). At common law, a married woman’s legal being was 
suspended; she was “covered” by her husband—hence the term cover-
ture to describe the law of marriage. In turn, husbands were required 
to support their wives (Grossman and Friedman 2011, 59–61). Modern 
family law views marriage differently; husbands and wives no longer 
have distinct and separate roles. But marriage law still encourages finan-
cial dependency and presumes that spouses will care for one another 
and provide for one another. Family law doctrines such as community 
property assume that under ordinary circumstances, couples will pool 
their resources; remedies such as maintenance (alimony) can require 
spouses to continue to fulfill their duty to support one another even after 
divorce. Marriage also can affect access to welfare benefits. Benefits can 
be terminated through marriage by imputing the income of a spouse to 
a recipient; conversely, some benefits under Social Security become avail-
able only through marriage. Underlying all of these rules is the assump-
tion—and, sometimes, legally enforceable rule—that spouses have a 
duty to support one another. This duty, in turn, prevents married people 
from becoming a drain on the state. In the United States, the extent to 
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which the law relies on marriage to privatize dependency is much more 
extreme than in most other Western nations. Health insurance, for 
example, is not provided by the government but rather through employ-
ers to both employees and employees’ spouses—hence the oft-repeated 
phrase that someone is married to healthcare.7 The notion of privatized 
dependency is also at least partially responsible for the other public ben-
efits granted to (or requirements imposed on) married couples: eligibil-
ity for lawful immigration status, a fast track to citizenship, exemptions 
from the estate tax, and joint income tax filing are all examples of how 
the state presumes that married couples share a financial interdepen-
dence not shared by cohabiting couples, friends, roommates, or siblings.
Public Commitment
Despite its roots in the regulation of sex and procreation and the priva-
tization of dependency, legal marriage has a cultural force that goes 
far beyond the bundle of rights and duties it encompasses. As the US 
Supreme Court put it in a case establishing the right of prison inmates 
to marry, marriages are “expressions of emotional support and public 
commitment,” and “many religions recognize marriage as having spiri-
tual significance.” Even if the state were to stop attaching public benefits 
and private duties to marriage, many people would likely want to marry 
to demonstrate their commitment to each other or to their religious 
communities. Marriage confers the state’s seal of approval on a particu-
lar type of adult intimate relationship.8
Bundling
Marriage is a status that bundles all of these elements together. The ben-
efits associated with the status change over time, but the status remains 
intact. The core element that remains the same is the bundling together 
of private obligations, public benefits, and religious, social, and state 
approval. When a plaintiff sues for the right to marry, the right claimed 
is entry into this preferred status with which various financial benefits 
and mutual obligations have been bundled. Take away any of these indi-
vidual rights (e.g., the marital exemption from the estate tax, or the 
right to sponsor a spouse for immigration status) and the status still 
retains its importance but with a different combination of rights embed-
ded in it. But take away the right to the status itself and the denial of the 
rights within it becomes an issue of constitutional magnitude (Sunstein 
2005). In marriage, the whole really is more than the sum of its parts.
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Legally and culturally, then, marriage has many meanings. If polyga-
mous groupings were to be recognized as legal marriages, what would 
this recognition look like? At first glance it appears simple. Multiple 
spouses could enter into legally sanctioned marriages by seeking licenses 
and marrying ceremonially through state-approved procedures. Plural 
marriages would be recognized as well at divorce or death. But recog-
nizing multiple spouses at divorce or death creates a host of potential 
difficulties.
Divorce, Plural Marriage, and Family Privacy
Normally, state family law regulates marriage primarily at entry and exit 
(divorce). Between entry and exit, however, state intervention is the rare 
exception rather than the norm. The law intervenes in cases of criminal 
violence between spouses, but courts are inclined to stay out of spouses’ 
midmarriage financial agreements, their injuries to each other, and 
their failures to support or provide services to each other. A spouse who 
is having marital problems cannot sue for enforcement of the marital 
contract; the only remedy is divorce.
Recognition of polygamous marriage, however, could dramatically 
alter this norm for the participants in polygamous marriages because 
in polygamy, there is no “mid-game” (Davis 2010, 1990). Polygamous 
relationships can be extremely unstable—think, for example, of FLDS 
(Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) member 
Alex Joseph’s eight divorces—and the frequent, if not constant, entry 
and exit of new spouses would create many more occasions and oppor-
tunities for state intervention (Emens 2004, 317). This ongoing state 
oversight would alter marriage, at least in the case of polygamy, in sev-
eral important ways. Each time a new person entered or exited a mar-
riage, the change would alter the interests of existing spouses in their 
marital or community property. At exit, just as in any other divorce, a 
court would have to approve a division of marital property. In marriages 
with plenty of wealth, this process would be costly for the court system 
because spouses might engage in protracted litigation where so much 
property was at stake. In marriages with little wealth, the divorce itself 
might be simpler, but the effects on the public fisc would be more prob-
lematic. Women’s income decreases dramatically upon divorce, and, 
indeed, young women appear to be worse off if they marry and divorce 
than if they never marry at all (Hamilton 2012). Similarly, a court would 
have to determine eligibility for and the amount of maintenance to be 
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awarded at multiple points during a multiperson marriage, and the for-
mula for determining maintenance would have to be altered to include 
the reality of multiple mutually obligated parties.9
Being in a legally recognized polygamous marriage, then, could 
involve much more state intrusion than being in a legally recognized 
monogamous marriage. People who stay in a monogamous marriages 
for fifty years experience family privacy—a lack of state intrusion—for 
each of those fifty years. Their interactions with the state regarding their 
families are limited to specific instances, such as filing joint tax returns, 
obtaining a child’s birth certificate, or exercising their authority to make 
medical decisions on behalf of an incapacitated spouse. But a person 
who stays in a polygamous marriage for fifty years may see many hus-
bands or wives come and go and experience the state’s intrusion into 
the details of those comings and goings at multiple and unpredictable 
moments: Whose fault was it? Who owns what? How much support must 
the existing spouses pay the one who is leaving and for how long? Who 
has custody of the children? This family-state dynamic is much different 
from what we are accustomed to and might be undesirable to many peo-
ple—including polygamous families themselves. Similar observations 
have been made about the law of inheritance (Davis 2010).
Polygamy and Marriage-Based Public Benefits
The state law of marriage, divorce, and inheritance is not the only legal 
context within which and through which polygamy could be recognized. 
Marriage is a status category of central importance in the allocation of 
benefits in the modern welfare state. Tax benefits and burdens, food 
stamps, welfare payments, social security, pensions, health insurance, 
and immigration status all take marriage to be a stable and useful cat-
egory for determining eligibility, noneligibility, and axes of dependency 
among individual people.
Marriage is often assumed to be largely private and contractual; 
spouses agree to take responsibility—financial and emotional—for 
one another. But many of the benefits of marriage are conferred by 
the state, and they cannot be easily divided among multiple spouses. A 
bank account could, in theory, be divided into thirds just like a pie if 
one member of a polygamous trio divorced the other two. This dividing 
up might be unfortunate for a spouse who would, under monogamous 
circumstances, have received half the pie instead of one-third, but we 
might justify it as the fruits of a joint venture to which that spouse is pre-
sumed to have contributed one-third of the profits.
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Public benefits, in contrast, are not carved from “pies” owned by a 
partner to the marriage. Take, for example, the social security retire-
ment system. The social security system protects low-earning married 
retirees with high-earning spouses at the expense of couples who earn 
similar amounts over their lifetimes and single people. For example, a 
retiree can claim either 100 percent of her own social security entitle-
ment (determined, in part, by how much she earned over her lifetime) 
or, alternatively, if she is married, the equivalent of 50 percent of her 
spouse’s entitlement. This 50 percent is in addition to the 100 percent 
her spouse claims. The family where one spouse opts for the 50 percent 
instead of her own entitlement (presumably because it is more than her 
own entitlement) receives 150 percent of the higher-earning spouse’s 
entitlement; this additional money has to come from somewhere, and it 
comes from the income paid into the system by the many single people 
or worried married people who will not be claiming a spousal benefit.
When a spouse elects to take the equivalent of 50 percent of her 
spouse’s entitlement rather than 100 percent of her own, she is not tak-
ing part of a pie earned by her spouse; her spouse still gets to keep his 
or her whole pie. Instead, the availability of the spousal entitlement is a 
cash incentive, given to families who structure themselves into a bread-
winner/homemaker model at the expense of those who do not (Liu 
1999). Social security benefits are not simply marriage-based benefits; 
they are benefits that reward a particular type of marriage.
Were the federal government to recognize polygamy, it would have 
to decide what to do about multiple spouses. Imagine first a family of 
five spouses: one breadwinner spouse and four homemaker spouses who 
either made no income during their lifetimes or income so insubstantial 
that 50 percent of the breadwinner spouse’s entitlement would exceed 
100 percent of their own. Would they each have the option of taking 
the equivalent of 50 percent of the breadwinner spouse’s payout? In 
other words, would that family receive 300 percent of the breadwinner 
spouses’s entitlement (100 percent of that spouse’s entitlement going 
to him or her, and 50 percent of the entitlement going to each of four 
spouses)? Or, instead, would the earning spouse have the opportunity 
or obligation to designate only one spouse, by premarital contract or 
other means, who would collect that portion of the payout, leaving three 
of the four spouses entirely without retirement income? Or perhaps 
the spousal entitlement would be divided into equal shares, with each 
homemaker spouse receiving 12.5 percent of the breadwinner spouse’s 
entitlement. Our current system already recognizes “serial polygamy.” As 
Nancy Polikoff has pointed out, the politician Newt Gingrich has been 
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married three times, and since each marriage lasted longer than ten 
years, each wife is eligible to receive the spousal benefit, which means 
his family could end up costing taxpayers 250 percent of his entitlement 
(Polikoff 2008). Recognition of polygamy would expand this form of 
federal subsidy beyond multiple serial marriages to multiple simultane-
ous ones.
Even more complex would be cases in which a polygamous family 
contained more than one breadwinner spouse. Could more than one 
spouse take the equivalent of 50 percent of more than one spouse’s 
social security entitlement? Or would the non-earning spouses simply 
split 50 percent of each of the earning spouses’ pensions? Currently, 
spouses cannot take social security retirement from more than one 
spouse; if they meet the requirements, because of divorce, based on 
more than one spouse, they must choose one. But polygamy might put 
a wrench in this system; if a reason underlying the spousal entitlement 
rule is that we think that marriage privatizes dependency and that mar-
ried couples pool their resources, then why shouldn’t spouses in a family 
with two breadwinners and three homemakers also get credit for pool-
ing their resources? As in state family law, frequent divorce would fur-
ther complicate this picture, making it likely that polygamous families 
would create complex webs of breadwinner and homemaker spouses, 
married and divorced in various combinations over time, a possibility 
that the social security system would be very ill-equipped to handle.
Social security is just one example of how marital benefits are not 
always analogous to dividing up a pie. Indeed, the flexibility of the size 
of the pie explains, at least in part, Utah’s codification of “purporting 
to marry” or cohabiting with a second person as criminal bigamy (par-
tially struck down in Brown). Utah’s legislators were concerned that 
FLDS women were claiming to be single and collecting welfare benefits, 
including food stamps, based on their household size and income with-
out considering their husbands’ incomes. Thus, the legislature made 
it a crime to “purport to marry” or cohabit with another if that person 
was already married. One way of understanding this prohibition is that 
the pie available in public benefits had been fraudulently increased; by 
appearing to be fatherless, husbandless families, the individual house-
holds headed by wives were eligible for more than their fair share of 
state largesse. Of course, if the women had been single mothers, they 
would have been entitled to this support, and it is unclear why the exis-
tence of a spiritual husband necessarily makes him available for sup-
port. In this light, the law looks like a back-door attempt to reintroduce 
the “spouse in the house” rules struck down in the late 1960s by the 
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US Supreme Court. A lurking concern may have been that as a practi-
cal matter, most of the wives were turning over their welfare checks to 
their husbands; thus, the financial transaction ultimately looked like the 
“hub” of a plural marriage collecting from “the spokes” payments that 
were in turn provided by the state—payments that the “hub” was not 
entitled to even if the “spokes” were.10
Pa rT i a l  r e c o g n i T i o n
Full recognition of polygamy seems, at this juncture, to be politically 
unlikely; the legal obstacles, as outlined above, add to this unlikelihood. 
But what about partial recognition? Could polygamy be recognized 
for some purposes but not others? To some extent, partial recognition 
already occurs in the United States. Some polygamous wives, for example, 
have had the marriage law of their countries of origin, where polygamy 
was legal, recognized in the context of inheritance. Other countries, how-
ever, have far more experience with recognition of polygamy for some 
purposes and not others. This partial recognition might at first glance 
seem like an attractive option since it could protect vulnerable second, 
third, or fourth wives in some circumstances without incentivizing polyg-
amy by recognizing it for all purposes. When we take a close look at 
how partial recognition has played out, however, it seems less desirable 
because it is difficult for the government to predict how the particular 
combination of recognition and nonrecognition rules will play out. To 
consider how partial recognition works in various contexts, let’s exam-
ine how a decision about recognition of polygamy for immigration status 
works in tandem with recognition of polygamy for welfare purposes.
Whether a country recognizes polygamy for immigration purposes 
may seem relatively unimportant if the polygamists one has in mind are 
FLDS constituents. (Note, however, that the early LDS church attracted 
plural wives by advertising in Europe and offering to pay the immigra-
tion expenses of interested women.) Immigrants are likely to be the 
group that is most invested in the legal recognition of polygamy. For 
these polygamists, primarily Muslims from other countries seeking a bet-
ter life abroad, immigration recognition would appear to be crucial. In 
fact, in its opinion upholding Canada’s antipolygamy law, the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia expressly mentioned the likelihood that 
polygamists would see Canada as an attractive target of immigration as a 
factor important to its decision.11
The United States bans outright immigration by those who “intend 
to practice polygamy in the United States.” “Practicing polygamists” 
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are also ineligible for naturalized citizenship on the grounds that they 
are, by definition, not people of “good moral character.” These rules 
effectively deny second and subsequent wives the security that immigra-
tion status would confer. Thus, these wives usually enter the country on 
tourist visas, overstay, and become subject to deportation if detected 
and apprehended. As Claire Smearman (2009) has shown, the law is 
calibrated to confer protection on a husband and one wife. Because the 
husband may sponsor his children for lawful immigration status regard-
less of whether he is married to their mothers, second and subsequent 
wives may find themselves trapped in a relationship in which they may 
lose access to their children, either because the husband sponsors the 
children for lawful immigration status and leaves the wife behind or 
because the wife will be subject to deportation if she attempts to leave 
her husband and gain custody of the children. And because unauthor-
ized immigrants are not eligible for welfare, she would have difficulty 
striking out on her own. Thus may nonrecognition for immigration pur-
poses have unintended and very painful consequences for some of those 
living in polygamy.12
In contrast, the United Kingdom and France have each partially rec-
ognized polygamy, but neither country’s experience indicates that it has 
found a method of partial recognition clearly superior to the United 
States’. Like the United States, both of these countries are modern wel-
fare states that give public benefits, including unemployment insurance 
and housing subsidies, to impoverished citizens and residents. And both 
are attractive destination countries for immigrants. But when a country 
partially recognizes polygamy, there can be unintended consequences.
The United Kingdom: No (at Least Officially) to Immigration, Yes to Welfare
The majority of families practicing polygamy in the United Kingdom 
are Muslim immigrants from Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, India and 
Bangladesh, although recent news reports indicate that polygamy is 
making a revival among second- and third-generation Muslims whose 
parents or grandparents emigrated from those countries. In the United 
Kingdom, individuals cannot legally enter into a polygamous marriage, 
but those who enter into a polygamous marriage abroad and then reside 
in the United Kingdom do not face criminal penalties. Recognition 
beyond this limited decriminalization is partial. Husbands cannot spon-
sor more than one wife for immigration status. Immigration law does 
provide, however, some legal avenues for entry of new wives: husbands 
sometimes sponsor new wives for immigration status by claiming them 
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as nannies for their children or as caretakers for sick relatives. Some 
women come on visitors’ visas and overstay, so they are technically unau-
thorized but difficult to locate or deport. Finally, a husband can divorce 
his first wife but continue to live with her and be married to her under 
Islamic law and then sponsor an additional wife whom he legally mar-
ries (and he could continue to do this serially). The UK Immigration 
Rulebook requires that the new wife in this last circumstance be given 
entry clearance, even where the divorce of the previous wife “is thought 
to be one of convenience,” the husband is still living with the previous 
wife, and “to issue the entry clearance would lead to the formation of a 
polygamous household.” Taken together, these rules have made it fairly 
easy for husbands from countries where polygamy is practiced to expand 
their families by marrying new wives in Islamic (Nikah) ceremonies and 
then bringing them to the United Kingdom.13
Once present, wives in polygamous families have several options for 
obtaining welfare benefits. One is to simply admit that their family is 
polygamous and apply for income support benefits or jobseeker’s ben-
efits (“the dole”). Although polygamous marriages are not recognized 
for immigration status, the United Kingdom does recognize them for 
income-support benefits and jobseeker’s benefits. In late 2007, the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), after a multiagency inves-
tigation, issued new guidelines for income support, stating, “Where 
there is a valid polygamous marriage the claimant and one spouse 
will be paid the couple rate. . . . The amount payable for each addi-
tional spouse is presently £33.65 pounds ($66.41).” This payment may 
be made directly into the husband’s bank account if his wives agree. 
A Department of Works and Pensions spokesman justified the rule 
by arguing that it did not “reward” polygamy since second wives are 
worse off than single women, who are eligible for a greater jobseeker’s 
allowance (£60 per week) than is a second wife (£33.65 per week). A 
husband with many wives may also be eligible for additional housing 
benefits and council-tax benefits in order to reflect the larger housing 
space needed for his family.14
Thus, the United Kingdom partially recognizes polygamy. It is illegal 
to enter into a plural marriage in the United Kingdom, but the country 
recognizes those formed legally elsewhere. The country does not confer 
on polygamous spouses eligibility for immigration benefits, but it does 
confer housing, unemployment, and welfare benefits, and there are 
alternative immigration routes. The British government estimates that 
there are 1,000 polygamous families living in Britain, but social work-
ers interviewed by journalists estimate that the actual number is closer 
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to 20,000. This difference is likely reflected by the government’s focus 
on polygamous families who are living together and potentially eligible 
for benefits. Families who choose not to live together can actually ben-
efit more from the welfare system than can those who choose recogni-
tion, and the majority of polygamous families in the United Kingdom 
are likely not seeking recognition at all. As in Utah, many women in 
polygamous marriages simply live apart from their husbands and seek 
welfare benefits at the higher single rate. This practice has recently been 
the subject of several media exposés, with some critics recommending a 
requirement that those who enter into Nikah marriages register as mar-
ried with the government, which would open the door to criminal sanc-
tions against those who marry more than one spouse.15 The increased 
number of third-generation Muslims in the United Kingdom who are 
practicing polygamy may have resulted in part from the relatively lax 
approach the United Kingdom has taken toward public benefits.
France: No to Welfare, Yes to Immigration (at Least at First)
A contrasting example of this dynamic occurred in France. Until recently, 
France opted for a fairly open immigration policy. Prior to 1993, France 
legally recognized foreign polygamous marriages for immigration pur-
poses as long as they were valid in the country in which they were per-
formed (Starr and Brilmayer 2003, 245). France has a large immigrant 
population, due in part to its colonial presence in much of Africa, 
including Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Guinea and in part to its 
post-war immigration policy, which encouraged the migration of guest 
workers in boom times and their deportation when the economy went 
bust (Scales-Trent 1999, 720). Taken together, these factors brought to 
France a much larger population of polygamous immigrants than that 
found in the United Kingdom. Indeed, many experts estimate that there 
were 200,000 people living in polygamous families in France by the 
1990s (721). The majority of these families are immigrants from sub-
Saharan Africa, and there is a sizeable population of such immigrants 
from Algeria and Morocco as well.
Like the United Kingdom, France recognizes polygamous marriages 
entered into in a jurisdiction where polygamy is legal. And just as the 
United Kingdom allows foreigners to follow the law of their domicile 
in marriage customs, France too recognizes polygamy if authorized 
by a noncitizen’s personal status (Scales-Trent 1999, 721). Polygamous 
families are recognized by the systems that allocate some public benefits 
but not by others. For example, according to Judy Scales-Trent (1999), 
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family allowances are available based on the number of children in a 
family, but the father is the beneficiary of these allowances. Thus, he can 
claim and collect a family allowance for children from multiple wives. 
In contrast, a second wife in a family in which the first wife also is living 
in France cannot receive benefits that might otherwise be thought to 
accrue directly to her, such as health insurance with maternity coverage, 
since these benefits can only be assigned to one wife. This form of par-
tial recognition enables men to create large families with multiple wives 
and children but places the second and subsequent wives in vulnerable, 
even perilous, positions.
Prior to 1993, then, France recognized polygamy in a partial and frac-
tured way. Polygamy was recognized for immigration purposes and for 
family benefits flowing to fathers to support children from multiple 
wives, but it was not recognized in connection with personal benefits 
that could be paid directly to second and subsequent wives. During 
Charles Pasqua’s term as interior minister, France began to adopt a 
much more conservative stance toward immigration. In 1993, France 
passed several new immigration laws, known as the Pasqua Laws, which 
limited spousal visas and working papers to only one spouse (Starr and 
Brilmayer 2003, 247). The Pasqua Laws also made the children of sec-
ond spouses ineligible for the family allowance benefit. In other words, 
France moved from a partial recognition system to a system in which 
recognition was far more minimal than before. Indeed, the only rec-
ognition after the Pasqua Laws, at least prospectively, was that a polyga-
mous marriage entered into elsewhere was not a crime. Retrospectively, 
however, the Pasqua Laws reshaped the formerly fractured recognition 
of polygamy in surprising ways. The law made the ban on recognition 
of polygamy for immigration and welfare purposes retrospective as well, 
but to avoid a clash with international human-rights norms, it gave fami-
lies a loophole. If the husband divorced all of his wives but one and 
physically separated the household so that each wife lived separately, 
the wives would not be deported and would not lose their working and 
residence papers. Because French law lacked the power to invalidate 
any Muslim marriage, families were thus able to maintain their marital 
status for religious purposes so long as they were legally divorced and 
not cohabiting. French authorities have been strict about enforcement; 
renting apartments in the same building is not sufficient to constitute 
the “decohabitation” required by law (Starr and Brilmayer 2003, 248).
Partial recognition always occurs against the backdrop of a particular 
legal and cultural context, and it is the context that matters as much or 
perhaps even more than the formal recognition. The French experience 
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differs from the English one in important ways. First, and most obviously, 
the total number of immigrants practicing polygamy is much higher in 
France.16 Causation is difficult to infer from bare immigration statis-
tics. Given the colonial relationships between France and many African 
countries and given its guest-worker-driven immigration policy, polyga-
mist immigrants might have migrated there regardless of France’s stance 
on polygamy. But it seems at least possible that its early recognition of 
polygamy, at least for immigration-status purposes, may have prompted 
larger numbers of polygamists to move there, whether they were polyga-
mist immigrants choosing France as a destination country or deciding 
to practice polygamy upon their arrival. Important too are the different 
attitudes toward assimilation taken by the United Kingdom and France. 
The United Kingdom has generally approached immigration and citi-
zenship through an integrationist policy, encouraging the maintenance 
of cultural ties and distinguishing integration from a more coercive 
assimilation. In contrast, France has more aggressively demanded that 
immigrants conform to French culture, an approach famously debated 
in the press when a Muslim woman who wore the niqab was refused citi-
zenship in 2008 (Mullally 2010, 194–97).
Recognition of polygamy, then, can take multiple forms, and the 
forms can fluctuate depending on the social, cultural, economic, and 
legal terrain on which polygamy is practiced. In a country with a robust 
welfare system, full recognition may well require extending benefits to 
polygamous families. Indeed, the expansive view most Western democ-
racies now take toward extramarital sex and childrearing may well 
require some form of recognition, in that the children of polygamous 
mothers are difficult to distinguish from the children of unmarried 
mothers, at least in terms of their moral claim to state support. In some 
ways, recognition in a strong welfare state is an easier proposition than 
it is in a country like the United States, where public benefits are still 
largely tied to marriage and, in particular, to incentivizing a division of 
labor within marriage.
a r e  w e  a l l  P o ly g a m i s T s  n ow ?
So far, this essay has focused on the ways in which full recognition of 
polygamy would substantially change the law of marriage and the ways 
in which partial recognition could have unintended consequences. 
There is a third, and important, piece to the puzzle. Some of the ben-
efits and obligations of marriage can be granted even without formal 
recognition of a relationship as a marriage. This form of recognition is 
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becoming increasingly common in nonpolygamous families. When we 
add together the various forms of recognition of functional families, 
what we end up with may look very much like formal recognition of 
polygamy, or formal recognition of polygamy for some purposes, mak-
ing full recognition less important.
Recognition of Nonmarital Adult Relationships
In many jurisdictions, cohabiting couples are treated like married 
couples for some purposes. Often, this form of recognition treats the 
couple as married for joint property purposes but not state benefits, 
although the reverse is sometimes true. Take, for instance, Washington 
state. Under Washington case law, if a couple is in a “committed inti-
mate relationship,” property obtained during that relationship will be 
treated as community property to be equitably divided upon dissolution 
of the relationship, just as property obtained during marriage would be 
at divorce. The factors courts consider in determining whether a couple 
is in a committed intimate relationship include continuous cohabita-
tion, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling 
of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the par-
ties. This recognition maps fairly neatly onto the theory of marriage as 
privatized dependency, expanding recognition beyond married couples 
to all who intend to become mutually dependent. The American Law 
Institute Principles of Family Dissolution suggest a similar rule that 
would make both property division and maintenance available to com-
mitted couples.17
Other jurisdictions allow unmarried adults to contract into relation-
ships that mimic some, but not all, of the elements of marriage. Cali fornia 
famously adopted this contractual approach in Marvin v. Marvin, a case 
involving the actor Lee Marvin and his long-term girlfriend Michele 
Triola, who went by Michele Triola Marvin.18 Similarly, New Jersey has 
recognized contractual relationships, and courts have enforced con-
tracts even where the contract is oral and implied rather than written 
and express.19
In addition to all of these judicially created doctrines recognizing 
nonmarital adult relationships, some jurisdictions have adopted legis-
latively created statuses. Most famously, many states and countries have 
passed civil-union, domestic-partnership, and reciprocal-beneficiary leg-
islation that allows same-sex couples, and in some instances different-
sex couples, or specifically senior-citizen couples, to enter into binding, 
legally recognized relationships without marrying. The primary feature 
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these schemes share is that the couples must opt in by registering; they 
cannot accidentally become “civil unioned.” Other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have legislatively adopted standards that resemble the judicially 
adopted “committed intimate relationships” rule. New Zealand, for 
example, recognizes marriages, civil unions, and “de facto relation-
ships.” A de facto partner is entitled not only to property division at 
dissolution but also access to alimony payments and inheritance rights 
(Atkin 2009). New Zealand also extends joint tax treatment, social assis-
tance, and immigration benefits to people in de facto relationships. 
Some Canadian provinces have adopted similar schemes.20
So what do these instances of recognition of nonmarital relationships 
have to do with polygamy, which is, after all, a form of marriage? Some 
of them may provide a back door to recognition of multiple intimate 
relationships without using the marriage or polygamy labels. In the Marvin 
case, for example, Lee Marvin and Michele Triola had lived together 
from 1965 to 1970 and presented themselves to the world as a married 
couple. But Marvin was legally married to another woman through 1967. 
The court nevertheless held that if she could demonstrate that she and 
Marvin had entered into a contract, Triola could recover on the con-
tract. Similarly, Roccamonte, a New Jersey case, involved a married man 
and his single female partner who lived together for thirty years while 
the man remained married to his wife. The court found that the couple 
had entered into an agreement that he would support his girlfriend for 
life, despite the financial effect this agreement could have on his ability 
to also support his existing wife. The New Zealand legislation uses “emo-
tional connection,” not monogamy, to determine whether a “de facto 
relationship” exists; multiple relationships, and de facto relationships 
combined with marriages or civil unions, are certainly possible.21 (In 
contrast, Washington state will not recognize a committed intimate rela-
tionship if either party is married to someone else; similarly, civil unions 
and domestic partnerships are generally available only to the unmar-
ried.) In those jurisdictions that do allow for the possibility of multiple 
legally recognized relationships, the state’s refusal to recognize polyg-
amy may be irrelevant to the day-to-day lives of polygamous families. 
In these instances, the state does recognize multiple affective adult rela-
tionships, or at least partially recognizes them (granting, for example, 
property division but not immigration benefits, or inheritance rights 
but not welfare access). With a menu of options available, individuals, 
couples, and groups of affiliated people can largely tailor their relation-
ships to their own needs and purposes. In fact, they might actually be 
better off than if they were all legally married to each other. Remaining 
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single, for example, might make some eligible for welfare benefits, and 
the group could devise strategies for using the law to shape the varying 
relationships among family members through cohabitation contracts or 
establishing eligibility for recognition of nonmarital status relationships.
Recognition of Multiple Parent-Child Relationships
In addition to the recognition of nonmarital relationships, many juris-
dictions are also increasingly recognizing multiple parent-child rela-
tionships. As recently as 1989, US Supreme Court Justice Scalia could 
declare, “California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual 
fatherhood.”22 That is no longer so. In 2013, the California legislature 
passed a statute that allows more than two parents to be declared the 
legal parents of a child. The Dutch legislature is considering a simi-
lar move. The United Kingdom has long allowed an additional adult, 
beyond a child’s two parents, to obtain “parental responsibility” with-
out full legal parenthood. Delaware’s “de facto-parent” doctrine allows 
a child, under certain circumstances, to have full legal parenthood. A 
Pennsylvania court recognized a genetic mother, her former lesbian 
partner, and their sperm donor as the legal parents of a child. The 
District of Columbia allows a sperm donor to contract with a child’s 
intending parents so that all three retain legal parentage. Several states 
in the United States have allowed “third parent adoption,” in which both 
genetic parents retain legal parent status but allow a third party (often 
the partner or spouse of one of the parents) to adopt the child as well. 
And many states now allow a parent to relinquish a child for adoption 
but retain visitation rights. Some of these jurisdictions are actually allow-
ing three or more parents to be legal parents; others (like the United 
Kingdom and the postadoption-contract-agreements states) only allow 
two parents but give partial recognition, through the right to enforce-
able visitation, to a third adult.23
As discussed previously, the law has already come very far from when 
it considered marriage to be the solely appropriate space for parent-
ing. The dismantling of illegitimacy as a salient legal category and the 
decriminalization of extramarital sex went far to disaggregate sex from 
marriage from procreation. Sex and procreation have become further 
disaggregated as a practical matter through sperm and egg donation, 
in-vitro fertilization, and surrogacy. The recent recognition of multiple 
parenthood takes this disaggregation one step further. It’s not just that 
a couple doesn’t have to be legally married to be a child’s parents but 
that the individuals claiming parenthood don’t have to be a couple at 
246   K E R Ry  A B R A M S
all. They could be a sperm-donor friend of a lesbian couple; they could 
be a married heterosexual couple and the wife’s ex-husband; they could 
be three friends who decide to have a baby.
A Menu of Options
Taken together, complete or partial recognition of multiple adult rela-
tionships and complete or partial recognition of multiple-parenting 
relationships could provide many of the benefits of recognition of polyg-
amy while avoiding some of the problems. The state could decide, for 
example, that public benefits such as Social Security or estate-tax exemp-
tions would only apply to married couples or, perhaps, require individu-
als to designate their “plus one” for benefits that are not pie-like in their 
ability to be divided. But individuals could contract or register their 
way into legally recognized relationships with multiple adult partners in 
order to foster financial and emotional interdependency or to ensure 
their children are emotionally and financially supported (or both). For 
some polygamists, this form of self-selecting specific forms of recog-
nition might be preferable to wholesale recognition of polygamy as a 
form of marriage. Contract regimes, especially, enable spouses in plural 
marriages to negotiate the terms of each relationship within the group. 
Functional tests, such as the New Zealand “de facto-relationship” law, on 
the other hand, would be more difficult to use for planning purposes. 
Since the relationship is recognized only when a claim for benefits is 
made or a relationship dissolves, it would be difficult to know in advance 
whether the requirements for a de facto relationship had been met; it 
is the facts in de facto, after all, that determine whether the relationship 
passes muster, not only the parties’ intent. This uncertainty might make 
this form of recognition less attractive to polygamists.
It is important to acknowledge that the law in this area is developing. 
We are not all polygamists—not yet. Many jurisdictions do not recognize 
multiple parenthood; many more do not recognize nonmarital intimate 
relationships as having a meaning beyond a personal one. But the direc-
tion the law is moving in is toward increased recognition of sexual and 
parenting relationships independent from marriage (and independent 
from each other) and toward abolishing the “rule of two,” both for inti-
mate adult relationships and for the number of parents a child can have. 
If this trend continues—and it seems likely that it will, given the increased 
number of LGBTQ families and blended stepfamilies creating families 
in which multiple parents are a reality—opening up the category of mar-
riage to polygamists may not be the legal avenue most likely to provide 
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recognition for polyamorous groups. And many people who benefit from 
these new doctrines may not think of themselves as polygamous, or even 
polyamorous, at all. They may be blended families who are coparenting 
children, married adults having affairs, or even roommates or siblings 
who want to create legally binding, mutual financial arrangements. In 
twenty years, we may well wake up to discover that the partial recognition 
of alternative family structures has crept into our lives and realize that 
whether the law recognizes polygamy as a form is entirely irrelevant.
c o n c l u s i o n
This essay has evaluated the recognition of polygamy and concluded 
that polygamy is likely to pose numerous challenges to recognition. 
Polygamy is particularly fraught because it exposes the ways in which the 
law of marriage already does not adequately reflect the needs of many 
families, and then exacerbates these inadequacies. Of course, this legal 
analysis is no substitute for an ethical one. It is, however, a necessary con-
sideration in any ethical analysis. Abstract ethical concepts can fall apart 
in the implementation of legal rules. Refusing to recognize polygamy, 
as in the example of US immigration policy, can put plural wives in an 
untenable situation, forcing them to choose between staying in an abu-
sive or unwanted marriage and losing custody of their children. Partial 
and full recognition, however, can have unintended consequences as 
well by encouraging dependency and fostering subordination within 
the family, and by sending mixed messages to individuals in polygamous 
families. And polygamous families may not use partial or full recogni-
tion in the way lawmakers might expect; they may prefer contractual 
relationships or nonrecognition to control by the state.
Thinking hard about recognition forces us to articulate what core 
values (if any) marriage protects in the first place. A careful analysis of 
what recognition of polygamy might look like demonstrates how diffi-
cult it would be to transform the work currently done by marriage law 
to a polygamous context. In contrast, the work that family law beyond 
marriage law is currently doing may be where polyamorous relationships 
are most likely to be recognized, in part or in full. Instead of arguing 
about decriminalization—which appears at this point to be constitution-
ally required—legal reformers should pay closer attention to how partial 
or full recognition of multiple adult-adult and adult-child relationships 
would help or hinder the family lives of all people, those who consider 
themselves polygamists and those who do not.
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